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Prize Money and Rising Expectations: 
Admiral Warren's Personal Fortune* 
by Julian GWYN* * 
Get place and wealth - if possible with 
Grace; if not, by any means, get wealth 
and place.••• 
I 
The sudden acquisition of great wealth invariably attracts the spon-
taneous attention of an awestruck and envious world. The popular esti-
mates seem invariably to exaggerate the size of such fortunes, while 
historians unhappily repeat this gossip, for want of proof, and thus give 
authority to suggestions which are far from true. 1 
Only rarely can a private fortune made before the nineteenth century 
be studied in detail for lack of evidence. What family keeps forever the 
bill and cheque books, the bank and letter books, the invoices and receipts, 
the records of stock transfers, credit advances and property deals upon 
which alone such studies can he based ? The ·almost inevitable disappear-
ance of such crucial documents has meant ·that only a few accounts of such 
private fortunes in the eighteenth century have been written. In England, 
among the merchants, William Braund's fortune is such an exception. 2 
Ia the American colonies there are detailed accounts only of the Beekmans 
of New York, the Dulanys of Maryland, the Nortons of Virginia, the 
• Research for this study ha.s largely been financed by the Canada Council to whom 
I am deeply grateful It formed the basis of a paper read at the 50th Annual meeting of the 
Canadian Historical A9800iation, St. John's. Newfoundland, June 1971. 
• • Department of History, University of Ottawa. 
••• Alexander PoPE (1688-1744), Epistles and Satires of Horace Imitated, III, Hor. l , 
Ep. I, To Lord Bolingbroke, 1. 103. 
1 The most celebrated example was William Beckford, the only son of Alderman 
Beckford, who was said to have inherited a fortune to the annual value of £ 48,000, when 
in fact it was only £ 27,000. See Lucy S. SUTHERLAND, "William Beckford", in The History 
of Parliament The House of Commons 1754-1790, edited by L.B. NAMIER and John BROOKE, 
3 vols. (London, 1964), II, p. 78. The rumour has most recently been repeated by Boyd 
ALEXANDER, England's Wealthiest Son (London, 1962). 
2 Lucy S. SUTHERLAND, A London Merchant 1696-1774 (London, 1933). About Samson 
Gideon, England's most important financier at mid-century, little more can be said than is 
found in Lucy S. SUTHERLAND, "Samson Gideon: Eighteenth Century Jewish FinanciP.r", 
Jewish Historical Society of England Transactions, XVII (1951-1952), pp. 79-90. 
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Pepperrells, Browns and Hancocks of New England. 3 In the West Indies 
only the Pinney family of Nevis has received detailed study, 4 while among 
the Nabobs the only fortune yet dissected by historians is that belonging 
to the celebrated Warren Hastings. 5 For a people as devoted to the 
accumulation of wealth and as noted for their rapacity as the British 
and Americans of the eighteenth century, this forms a surprisingly minute 
residue. 6 
It is in this context, however, that the analysis of another family 
fortune becomes a matter of more than passing interest. The wealth of 
Admiral Sir Peter Warren (1703-1752) is of particular concern for the 
light it casts on the acquisitive spirit of naval officers as a social group. 
By· good luck an impressive collection of Warren's private papers survive, 
partly in England and partly in America. 7 Unlike the usual collection 
of such papers they emphasize not his naval career, which was certainly 
of considerable interest, hut his activities as an entrepreneur. They offer 
the unique opportunity of analysing a fortune derived largely from prize 
money, a task hitherto not attempted. What merits attention is not the 
manner of Warren's accumul·ating wealth, for that was not exceptional, 
it is the mere fact that his fortune can he studied, while those of his 
contemporaries cannot. 
3 Philip L WHITE, The Beekmans of New York in Politics and Commerce 1647-
1877 (New York, 1956); Aubrey C. LAND, The Dulan.rs of Maryland, 2nd edition (Baltimore, 
1968); John Norton and Sons, Merchants of London and Virginia, edited by Francis Norton 
MASON (Richmond, 1937); Byron FAIRCHILD, Messrs. William Pepperrell: Merchants at 
Piscataqua (Ithaca, 1954); J. B. HEDGES, The Browns of Provi.dence Plantations: Colonial 
Years (Cambridge, 1952); W. T. BAXTER, The House of Hancock (Cambridge, 1945). 
4 Richard PARES, A West-India Fortune (London, 1950). 
G P. J. MARSHALL, "The Personal Fortune of Warren Hastings", The Economic 
History Review, 2nd series, XVII (Au£Ust, 1964), pp. 284-300. 
6 Very different would the story have been had contemporaries followed the sugges-
tion of Malachy PosTLETHWAYT, The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce, 4th 
edition (London, 1774), to establish a British Mercantile College to train young men in 
business and to preserve the "accounts of many distinguished and eminent merchants 
deceased ..• who trod the Royal Exchange with supreme credit and dignity", thus ensuring 
for posterity a record of the commercial and financial greatness of the kingdom. See "Mer-
cantile College", in vol II, no pagination. 
7 The Warren papers came principally through his grand-daughter, Susannah Maria 
Skinner, and, after her marriage in 1789 to Henry Gage, through the Gage family. Part of 
the collection was sold before 1930 to the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michi-
gan. The rest has been deposited, between 1958 and 1965, in the Sussex Archaeological 
Society at Lewes. Several archives in the U.S.A., notably the New York Historical Society 
and the Massachusetts Historical Society, have acquired Warren manuscripts, which relate 
especially to Warren's interests in New York and New England. 
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II 
It must be remembered that in the eighteenth century the Admiralty 
coold not compel its officers to serve. What then induced men to hazard 
their lives at sea ? Their salaries (at ten shillings a day for the captain 
of a frigate) were hardly a sufficient inducement. Social position, which 
officer's rank conferred, hardly suffices as an explanation, for those enter-
ing the navy and destined for the quarter-deck were usually of gentle 
birth. Patriotic duty, which so many naval historians have employed in 
explaining officers' motives, has clearly been over-worked and re:ftects 
more twentieth century notions than those of the eighteenth century. 
For ·anyone who has studied naval papers of the eighteenth century in 
depth, it is clear that the "chief attraction of the naval service" s was prize 
money, though there were other profitable sidelines. Of these the two 
most important were trade (carried on despite Admiralty orders against 
it, and with the connivance though sometimes over the objections of the 
mercantile community} , and freight money (one or two per cent of the 
gross value of bullion carried in a warship for public or private interests}. 
Prize money was particolarly valued only from 1708, when a new Act 
of Parliament declared the total proceeds of prize actions should there-
after be divided . only among the captors. 9 Before this the captors had 
shared only one-third of the proceeds, the rest being divided between 
the crown and the Admiralty. It was not until the 1739-1748 war that 
t'he serving officers first reaped the full benefit of this improvement. Such 
was the s~tem of dividing ·the spoils among the captors that senior officers 
were greatly favored. Three-eighths went to captains, who had to . convey 
one of these eighths if serving under a commodore or admiral. A cap~in 
in an active theatre of war had to be very unlucky not to share in a few 
prizes, while an admiral, from 1739 onwards, was almost certain of making 
a modest fortune. 10 
8 Daniel A. BAUGH, British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 
1965)' p. 112. 
9 See 6 Anne c. 13. Prize money, in contrast to prize law, has been neglected by 
historians. Only two brief studies, which hardly more than introduce the subject, are worth 
mentioning: Vie&Admiral Charles JoHNSTONE, "Naval Prize in War", The United Seroice 
Magazine, New Series, L (1914-1915), pp. 335-351, 447-463; LI 0915·1916), pp. 12-20; and 
Lieut.-Commander Peter KEMP, Prize Money, a Survey of the History and Distribution of 
the Naval Prize Fund (Aldershot, 1946), 33 pp. 
10 There were exceptions; and Admiral George Clinton was one. He gave up the 
Mediterranean command, reckoned to be the most lucrative, in the midst of war in 1741, 
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Let a few illustrations suffice Ito show how large these windfalls could 
be. In 1744 Captain George Anson returned to England from a four-year 
voyage around the world bringing captured prize property valued at more 
than £ 1% million. 11 The Louisbourg prizes in 1745 probably exceeded 
£ 428,000. 12 The net value of the French ships taken by Anson and 
Warren off Cape Ortega! in May 1747 was£ 755,896. 13 The Seven Years' 
War proved no less profitable. For instance, when Havana was taken in 
1762 •the prize money distributed to the naval and military forces amounted 
to more than£ 737,000, and Admiral Pocock's share alone was£ 121,989. 14 
Later wars brought lucky officers equally handsome rewards, while many 
an officer involved in less lucrative actions did well enough. Collingwood, 
for instance, left a fortune of£ 163,743, though he never considered him-
seH lucky in matters of prize money. 115 
III 
Admiral Sir Peter Warren was no less enthusiastic about prize money 
than his fellow officers, an<l f'.ar luckier than most. For him war was the 
na·tural blending of duty and profit. 16 The prospect of doing the enemy 
for the governorship of New York in the belief that he could repair his fortune more rapidly 
from the emoluments of colonial office than from prire money. See Stanley Nider KATz, 
Newcastle's New York, Anglo-American Politics, 1732-1753 (Cambridge, 1968),. pp. 33-35, 
242n. 
11 JOHNSTONE, op. cit., p. 592. 
12 This figure is arrived at by multiplying by a factor of 8 the minimum estimate of 
Warren's one-eighth share of £ 53,500. 
1a BAUCH, op. cit., p. 112. 
14 The Siege and Capture of Havana 1762, edited by David SYRETT, Publications of 
the Navy Records Society, vol 114 (London, 1970), pp. 305-313 for details of final prire 
distribution. Syrett notes: "The Keppels, having received a commander·in-chiefs share, a 
second-in-command's share, and a major-general's share, were probably the only men satis-
fied with the division of the Havana prire money, for the family's fortune was made by the 
campaign" (p. xxxiv). 
115 Oliver WARNER, The Life and Letters of Vice·Admiral Lord Collingwood (London, 
1968), p. 247. Admiral Viscount Keith, a contemporary of Collingwood's, "must have been 
one of the richest naval officers in the kingdom on his retirement". The Keith Papers, vol II, 
edited by Christopher LLOYD, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol 90 (London, 
1950), p. x. John Jervis (later Lord St. Vincent) rose from poverty to great wealth through 
prire money; see Evelyn BERCHMAN, Nelson's Dear Lord, A Portrait of St. Vincent (London, 
1962), pp. 188·194, for a detailed dispute between Jervis and Nelson over prire money. 
The case of Nelson is of interest for his biographers emphasire his naval feats at sea, his 
vanity and charm, his sense of patriotic duty, but rarely a word about his desire for gain 
or the fluctuations in his personal fortune. For a typical account, see Captain A. T. MAHAN, 
The Life of Nelson. The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, 2nd revised edition 
(Boston, 1899). 
16 In 1744 when Warren learned that French south sea and East India ships were 
at Louisbourg awaiting convoy home to France, Warren hoped to attack them. but was 
unable to gather the necessary force. He bemoaned his missed opportunity "of Serving my 
Country and makeing my fortune". Warren to Thomas Corbett (Secretary to the Admiralty), 
rt Sept. 1744, Adm 1/2654, Public Record Office, London. 
88 HISTOIBE SOCIALE- SOCIAL HISTORY 
harm while enriching himself made him impatient with the weather, 
deserting seamen, ill-sailing ships and officers less energetic than himseli. 
J.t also led him to take risks ·and to plague the Admiralty with constant 
demands for good ships and adequate supplies to keep them at sea. 17 
When the Admiralty's reaction was too slow, he commissioned the best 
of his prizes on his own initiative obliging the Navy Board to pay the cost. 
The war of 1739-1748 saw him emerge from obscurity to become 
(with Anson and Hawke to he sure) the most successful, most honored 
and wealthiest naval figure in the kingdom. Prize money accounted for 
not less than £ 126,000 of his £ 155,000 estate at the time of his death in 
1752. lS Of this, some £ 53,000 came from the Louishourg prizes and 
£ 48,000 in 1747, when he served in the Western Squadron. 
Not all of Warren's wealth came from prize money. Though he in· 
herited nothing from his parents, 19 it was through his mother's family 
that he had entered the navy: for him the path to wealth. His maternal 
tmcle was Admiral Matthew Aylmer, 20 Commander-in-Chief; and Aylmer's 
son-in-law, Admiral Sir John Norris, made Warren a post-captain at the 
early age of 24. 21 By living well within his income, Warren was able 
within three years of this promotion to purchase what remained of his 
17 For an example of one such letter, see Warren to Corbett, 9 Apr. 1744, Adm 
1/2654, P.R.O. 
18 For details, see Julian GWYN, "The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren" 
(unpublished D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1971), p. 32. Anson was certainly richer 
and Hawke poorer than Warren. Hawke is often held up as a rare example of an officer of 
that day who "conceived of duty as something to be kept distinct from politics or the hope 
of monetary reward. This is not to argue that Hawke was uninterested in prize money; but 
he set an example in showing that such personal considerations were to be subordinated 
to patriotic duty." Ruddock MACKAY, Admiral Hawke (Oxford, 196.5), p. 59. In 1747, one 
of Warren's nephews, Captain Warren Johnson, thought him "one of the Richest men in 
England . . . worth three or four Hundred Thousand Pound Sterling". To his brother, 
William Johnson, 13 Sept. 1747, The Papers of Sir William Johnson, vol I, edited by James 
SULI.IVAN (Albany, 1921). Though the Admiral probably never knew the exact extent of 
his fortune, he knew better and in 1750 confided to his brother·in·law, Oliver DeLancey, 
that his wealth was "not near so much as the World Imagine nor More than the Necessary 
Parade here Obliges me to Live up to". 11 Aug. 1750, Warren Papers 37, New York Histori-
cal Society. 
19 His father's will left him nothing, while his mother's only £ 3 for a mourning 
ring, GWYN, op. cit. p. 2. 
20 For Aylmer's career, see Sir Fenton AYLMER, The Aylmers of Ireland (London, 
1931)' pp. 168-195. 
21 For Norris, see D. D. ALDRIDGE, "Admiral Sir John Norris ... ", The Mariner's 
Mirror, LI (May, 196.5), pp. 173·183. Warren was made captain of the Grafton in 1727. 
It had been Edward Vernon's ship, and became vacant when Vernon was sent with an 
address of loyalty from the Baltic fleet upon the accession of George II. 
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family's estate in Ireland. 22 With a small income independent of naval 
wages and the status of Irish landowner, Warren concluded a lucrative 
marriage alliance in 1731, with a New York merchant family, the 
DeLanceys. 23 The DeLancey connection was of lasting importance to him. 
In monetary terms the alliance was worth in time at least £ 17 ,500 
New York currency, £ 9,000 as part of the marriage contract and the 
balance from inheritances in the 1740s. This resulted in Warren investing 
in landed property, money lending and in trade in America. By employing 
the DeLanceys as his agents Warren had at his disposal an outstanding 
source of business experience and acumen. This trans-Atlantic association, 
continued hy his heirs, lasted for more than sixty years. 
IV 
What use did Warren make of his fortune ? He invested it in 
America, Ireland and England. He bought land, loaned money, invested 
in the London stock market and occasionally dabbled in trade. He had 
one opportunity of investing in industry, when his wife inherited land 
upon which iron works had been established, hut he sold her interest 
almost at once. 
In America his land purchases were largely in the province of 
New York. His principal purchase took place in 1736 when he bought 
a 14,000-acre tract on the Mohawk where he attempted to establish a 
perm·anent settlement. 24 The scheme was a failure until after 1760 largely 
because of .the threat to the New York frontier occasioned hy the French 
in Canada and their Indian allies. 25 To superintend the estate Warren 
brought out from Ireland his nephew, William Johnson, a man of rare 
22 Purchased from his one surviving brother 19 Feb. 1729/30, Memorial 42,633, 
Deed Book LXIII, Register of Deeds, Dublin. The cost was £ 500. In 1726, Warren had 
received freight money for carrying bullion for the South Sea Company from Jamaica to 
London. Admiralty; Board Minutes, 26 April 1726, Adm 3/35, P.R.O.; D. Wescomb to the 
Admiralty, South Sea House, 26 April 1726, South Sea Company Papers, Add. Mss. 25560, 
fol 46, British Museum, London. 
23 The marriage contract, dated 20 July 1731, is in the John E. Stillwell Collection, 
New York Historical Society. For the DeLanceys, see Thomas JONES, History of New York 
during the Revolutionary War .•• , edited by Edward Floyd DELANCEY, 2 vols. (New York, 
1879), I, pp. 649-655. 
24 The property was called Warrensburg and was situated opposite the modern town 
of Amsterdam, N.Y. The initial purchase of 13,000 acres cost Warren only £ 130. GWYN, 
op. cit., pp. 129-130. 
25 For a useful revision of this aspect of New York's land question in the colonial 
era, see Sllng Bok Km, "A New Look at the Great Landlords of Eighteenth-Century New 
York", The William and Marr Quarterly, 3rd series, XXVII (October, 1970), pp. 581-614. 
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business talents, in whom Warren invested almost £ 8,000 New York cur-
rency. 26 Besides this important Mohawk property Warren acquired land 
elsewhere in New York. Several parcels were on Manhattan Island, the 
most important a 300-acre farm at Greenwich Village, a farm at Turtle 
Bay with facilities for careening warships, which he let to the navy, also 
in New York City proper especially along Broadway and Cortlandt 
street. 27 Furthermore, by direct purchase and by his wife's inheritance, 
Warren held a large stake in the DeLancey family's share of Cortlandt 
Manor astride the Croton river. Further afield 1he speculated in land in 
the neighborhood of Fort E·dward, on the upper Hudson; but no perma-
nent settlement flourished there until after the defeat of the French 
in Canada. 
Warren's American land interests were not confined to New York. 
In the 1730s, when he was stationed at Charleston, he received grants of 
land totalling 2,000 acres. 28 He also bought land on a small scale on 
the New Jersey shore of the Hudson river opposite his Greenwich estate. 
Moreover, his heirs acquired a large farm near Boston, for which Warren 
had held the mortgage as security on a loan which was not recovered. 29 
Warren's activities as a money lender in America began in 1731. 
His marriage contract specified that £ 6,000 New York currency should 
be invested in mortgages, bonds and similar securities. 30 The capital sum 
rose to a peak of almost £ 18,000 New York currency in 1752-1753 as 
Warren invested part of his prize earnings and as hie wife inherited 
similar securities from her father and brother. In New York, as was his 
custom wherever he made loans, Warren strictly adhered to ithe laws 
governing the rate of interest. 31 His debtors were either New York or 
28 Warren's relations with Johnson are considered in detail, GWYN, op. cit., Chapter 
Ill. For a useful earlier treatment of the matter, see Edith M. Fox, "William Johnson's 
Early Career as a Frontier Landlord and Trader" (unpublished M.A. essay, Cornell Univer-
sity, 194.5). For two excellent chapters on Johnson's skill as an entrepreneur, see Charles 
Roscoe CANEDY, Ill, "An Entrepreneurial History of the New York Frontier 1739-1776" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1967). 
27 See GWYN, op. cit.. Chapter II. 
2S Ibid., Chapter VI. The South Carolina property was made over in 1751 to another 
of Warren's nephews, Captain Oater Rear Admiral) Richard Tyrrell. 
29 The farm amounted to 862 acres and was situated at Framingham, on the Boston· 
Worcester road. 
_30 An analysis of Warren's New York money lending activities will appear elaewhere. 
William and Mary Quarterly. 
31 The ceiling on the rate of interest in New York was reduced in 1737 from 8 to 
7 per cent. The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Ret10lulion, 5 10& 
(New York, 1894), I, pp. 1004-1005. 
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New Jersey businessmen or his own tenants. Most debts were secured 
only by a bond, by which the debtor promised to repay the principal at 
a specified interest rate within an interval of a year. In fact such bonds 
were W!ually allowed to continue unredeemed for many years, though 
the number of bad debts was small in the long run. Warren rarely took 
mortgages as security on loans, though in two instances unredeemed 
mortgages resulted in Warren's acquiring important landed property. 
In Boston in 1746 Warren made loans amounting to £ 6,470, the capital 
coming from the Louisbourg prizes of the year before. 32 His debtors 
there were men whom he had served with at Louisbourg or had met in 
the summer of 1746 when he was in Boston planning, with Governor 
William Shirley, the assault on Canada. T·here, too, he favored the bond 
rather than the mortgage as an adequate instrument to secure his capital, 
practically all of which was recovered though some of it not until the 
1760s. Unlike his practice at New York, Warren in New England insisted 
in being repaid not in the provincial currency, which was then suffering 
rapid depreciation, but in sterling. Warren also loaned money in South 
Carolina in the early 1730s, hut his time at that station was so short and 
his capital then so limited that his activities there never amounted to 
much if compared with New York and Boston. 83 
In Ireland, Warren's first aim was the recovery of the family estate, 
called W arrenstown in County Meath. It had been forfeited under Crom-
well, recovered in 1663, forfeited again in 1689 and yet again recovered 
under the terms of the Treaty of Limerick in 1691. 34 Half the estate 
82 The legal ceiling on interest in Massachusetts was 6 per cent, The Acts and 
Resolves, Public and Private of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay ••• , 17 vols. {Boston, 
1869-1910), I, p. 111, in force since May 1693. For an account of Warren's money lending 
in New England, see my article in The New England Quarterly, XLlV (March, 1971), 
pp. 117-134. 
33 When Warren left Charleston in 1732, his affairs were partly in the hands of his 
friend Captain George (later Admiral Lord) Anson. 
34 Warren's grandfather, Oliver Warren, who had inherited Warrenstown from his 
father, John, in 1638, had sufiered almost total forfeiture between 1654 and 1663. Rev. 
Thomas WARREN, A History and Genealogy of the Warren Family (London, 1902), p. 187. 
When in 1662 a court was created to hear claims of those who had suffered 
confiscation under Cromwell, both Oliver Warren and his mother appeared before the 
tribunal and were restored to all the lands that had been forfeited. 7 Mar. and 4 May 1663, 
Appendix to the 19th Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records of Ireland (Dublin, 
1887), pp. 46, 52. Peter Warren's father, Michael, was an officer in the army of James II, 
and thereby forfeited his estates. By surrendering under the terms of the Treaty of Limerick 
(1691), he was offered the alternative of going to France and forsaking his estates, or of 
remaining in Ireland, submitting to William III, and being restored to his property. He 
chose to stay in Ireland. 1 July 1692, Trinity College, Dublin, MS., N.1.3.; published in 
"Irish Jacobite Lists", edited by J. G. SIMMS, Anelecta Hibernica, XXII (Dublin, 1960), 
p. 104. 
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was sold by Warren's eldest brother to pay off part of a large mortgage 
which their father had been obliged to give to sustain his declining 
years. 35 In 1730, Warren purchased the remaining half of the estate for 
a nominal sum of £ 500, 86 but was unable to recover the alienated portion 
until prize money began to accumulate in his hands in the 17 40s. In fact 
it was only in 1750 that he received a clear title to it, whereupon he 
established his nephew, John Johnson, as his principal tenant and agent. 87 
Before his death he had bought other estates in County Meath and County 
Dublin; and was in Ireland negotiating further purchases in 1752 when 
he died. His patronage of the Irish Johnsons, who unlike the American 
Johnsons remained Catholic, laid the basis of their later prosperity and 
rise in social status from tenant farmers to landowners of middling size. 
It was only in 1747, after Warren had established a stake in America 
and Ireland, that he invested in England on any scale. In the five years 
before his death he paid almost £ 15,000 for six farms in Hampshire. 38 
Comprising some 1,100 acres they lay together in the upper Meon valley 
north of Portsmouth. Only his early death prevented him from adding 
substantially to this investment. The wealth thus brought to the English 
land market, though made from prizes at sea, was in essence no different 
from ,that of a City magnate, west India merchant or returning Nabob. 
His desire to acquire land in England had little to do with serious invest-
ment. He paid a high price for the properties and they were cultivated 
by the Warrens at a loss until 1755. 89 Thereafter they were let to tenant 
farmers. Even then it never returned more than two per cent net, con-
siderably less than was earned from investments in the stock market or 
in private money lending. "It was", as Professor Habakkuk has remarked, 
"the fee he paid for admission into the charmed circle of English landed 
society." 40 By confining himself to a group of small properties in one 
811 The estate was sold for .£ 2,100, which left a debt of .£ 400. 31 May /1 June 1723, 
memorial 23,564, Book 35, p. 525, Register of Deeds, Dublin. The eldest brother Lieutenant 
Oliver Warren, R.N., died unmarried in August 1724 while on half-pay in Ireland. 
86 19-20 Feb. 1729/30, memorial 42,633, Book 63, p. 55, Register of Deeds, Dublin. 
87 John Johnson was William Johnson's youngest brother. In 1806 his son purchased 
Warrenstown and other Warren property for .£ 18,000. Gage Papers, G/lr/2 (52), Sussex 
Archaeological Society, Lewes. 
' 88 See GWYN, op. cit., Chapter vm. There is a plan of the house and gardens of the 
main property called Westbury in Gage Papers, G/Ha/42. 
728. 
8_9 A farm account book for the years 1753-1762 is found in Gage Papers, Additional., 
40 H. J. HABAKKUK, "The England Land Market in the Eighteenth Century'', in 
Britai,n and the Netherlands, edited by J. S. BROMLEY & E. H. KossMANN (Oxford, 1960), 
p. 171. ' 
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district and by retaining large investments in other forms, Warren was 
typical of many men of his generation, and very different from those of 
the seventeenth century, for whom wealth meant land and little else. 
Having no male heir, Warren was not tempted to erect a grand house, as 
so many of his contemporaries were. 41 Instead he bought a comparatively 
new house, which never was •an extravagant drain on his resources. Unlike 
the fictional Horatio Hornblower who felt completely ill at ease in the 
role of country gentleman and longed for the life at sea, Warren took 
easily to his new life on his Hampshire estates, entertaining, hunting, 
shooting, fishing, playing golf and cricket. 
Another important aspect of Warren's fortune related to his money 
lending activities. Warren was in Ireland and England as enthusiastic 
a money lender as in America. Throughout his career at sea from his first 
months as a post captain Warren loaned money to both his fellow officers 
and seamen. He acted as his seamen's hanker by purchasing their pay 
tickets at a discount and cashing them in when several months (and 
som.etimes years) later the ship was paid off. During the siege of Louis-
bourg in 1745, for instance, in order to encourage men to transfer to a 
French warship, Vigilant, newly-captured, Warren advanced cash to many 
a seaman in this manner, and received his return only in 1751 when the 
Vigilant was paid off. 42 Warren also loaned money to seamen and naval 
officers on the security of their anticipated prize money. Several of those 
who served with him at Louisbourg profited in this manner: Captain 
John Brett, £300; Lieutenant William Holhoume, £ 1,000; Captain War-
wick Calmady, £ 700. In Ireland, as in America, Warren was also a source 
of credit to his relations, principally his brother-in-law, Christopher 
Johnson, and his nephew, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Richard 
Tyrrell. 43 
41 Admiral Boscawen used part of his prize money to buy a property and build a new 
house at Hatchlands near Guildford. Admiral's Wife being the Life and Letters of ihe Hon. 
Mrs. Edward Boscawen from 1719-1761, edited by Cecil AsPINAL-0GLANDER (London, 1940), 
pp. 145, 247-8. Captain Oater Lord) Rodney was in the same financial league as Boscawen; 
and by 1750 his prize money was "transmuted into farms and copy•holdings in Hampshire 
'where he built himself a house'". David SPINNEY, Rodney (London, 1969), p. 87. Rodney's 
fortune is only naval officer's hitherto to have received more than passing notice from his-
torians. Yet even in his case much has been omitted by his biographer. 
42 See the Vigilant's pay book, Adm 33/393, P.R.O. 
43 Tyrrell was the elder son of Warren's sister Mary. Warren had fostered his career, 
Tyrrell proving himself an excellent officer. In 1751, Tyrrell took temporary leave of the 
navy to enter the sugar business in Antigua and received financial backing to the amount 
of £ 3,800 from Warren. Details in "Warren-Tyrrell accounts, 1751-54", Gage Papers, 
G/lr/l (9a). 
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It was an eighteenth-century piece of wisdom whioh held that ''the 
man who buys land has principal without interest; he who lays out his 
fortune in the Funds has interest without principal; hut he who lenfls 
on mortgage has both principal and interest". 44 Doubtless Warren would 
have agreed as forty per cent of his outlay in loans was secured hy mort-
gages, the rest hy bonds or notes of hand. Mortgages were taken from 
his neighbors in Hampshire, from his political allies, principally from 
the Earl of Egmont who received £ 3,000 at four per cent, and from those 
whom he met in the course of his business in London and Dublin. He was 
equally prepared to lend on the security of either English or lriiJh land, 
when many other sources of credit, notably London hankers and insurance 
companies, were reluctant to finance mortgages on Irish property, insisting 
instead whenever possible on English land as security. In contrast to 
his money lending activities in America, Warren loaned little money in 
Ireland and England to the mercantile community. However, there as 
in America he adhered strictly to the usury laws governing the rate 
of interest. Temptation to ignore the law could not have been great, for 
it so ·happened that much of his money lending activity occurred at a time 
of unusually low interest rates both in England and Ireland. •5 
Like so many other men of wealth in the eighteenth century, Warren 
did not confine his investments to land and money lending, but found 
the stock of the great trading companies, the new insurance companies, 
and particularly the funded debt of the government in England extremely 
attractive. This sector had expanded rapidly since the late seventeenth 
century, and an effective market in securities had developed with it in the 
City of London. 46 Warren invested £ 4,565 in South Sea Annuities, paid 
£ 807 for £ 500 East India Company stock; £ 13,000 in East India Annu-
ities; £ 54,000 in the 1745 3o/os; £ 15,000 in the 1748 4o/os; £ 5,000 in the 
1750 "Million Loan". 47 Besides the funded debt, Warren invested in the 
government's floating debt. In April 1748, upon receiving his -share of 
money from prizes taken in the May 1747 victory over the FTench off 
« Ascribed to Lord Mansfield, John HOLLIDAY, The Life of William Late Earl oJ 
Mansfield (London, 1797), pp. 469-470. 
411 See L M. CUI.LEN, Anglo-Irish Trade, l(j(j()-1800 (Manchester, 1968), p. 18.5, and 
T. S. ASHTON, Economic Fluctuations in England 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1959), p. 148. 
46 See P. G. M. D1cKS<>N, The Financial Revolution in England a study in the devel-
opment of public credit 1688-1756 (London, 1967). 
47 Details found in GWYN, op. cit., Chapter X. 
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Cape Ortegal, Warren bought Navy Board hills to the value of £ 21,140. 
He invested as well in the shares of the Sun Fire Office, buying fifty 
shares for £ 1,800 in 1750. 48 His total holdings had reached a peak of 
£ 86,500 (nominal value of £ 96,169) in 1749, when he began to diversify 
his interests by lending money on a large scale in England and Ireland 
and by making considerable additions to his estates in Ireland and Hamp· 
shire. To finance these schemes he used £ 25,000 of the 1745 3%s, which 
had risen above par and allowed him to realize a capital gain of £ 8,875. 
Ev~ with this large sale of stocks Warren still held government funds 
valued at £ 58,000 at the time of his death, a sum far in excess of that 
held by other naval officers. 49 From all this he emerged as a successful, 
well-organized opportunist, who had the remarkable good luck to make 
a fortune in prize money at a moment when the government greatly 
expanded its borrowing, and thus depressed the price of securities. 
By his will 50 Warren ensured the survival of his fortune at least for 
a further generation. One-third of the income from the estate was left 
to his widow and two-thirds to his daughters when they came of age. 51 
Lady Warren was not i1nclined to he spendthrift, and live~ well within 
her income adding at least £ 1,000 in capital to her husband's fortune for 
each of the nineteen years of her widowhood. She sold no land, nor 
indeed bought any. She continued lending money in New York, though 
on a reduced scale. She called in all the personal loans her husband had 
made in New England, South Carolina, Ireland and England, and con-
verted this capital to the Funds. This shift in emphasis is clearly shown 
in the following Table. 
4S See P. G. M. DICKSON, The Sun Insurance Office 1710·17(J() (London, 1960). Warren 
sold the shares a year later for £ 1,900, but then repurchased a further fifty which he re-
tained. See Sun Fire Office Share Transfer Book, MS. 12,0123/5, nos. 1295, 1306, Guildhall 
Library, London. 
49 Anson had £ 30,000 invested in five prominent stocks examined by Dr. Dickson; 
and Anson's nearest rivals in turn were: Admirals Isaac ToWD8elld with £ 19,000, Sir 
Chaloner Ogle £ 14.000, William Rowley £ 11,000, Lord Vere Beauclerk £ 3,200 and George 
Clinton £ 3,000. See DICKSON, Financial Revolution ... Loe. cit., pp. 295, '11:11, 331. 
60 Printed in The Papers of Sir '/l'illiarn Johnson, vol. XIIl, edited by Milton W. 
HAMILTON (Albany, 1965), pp. 19·22. 
Ill The eldest daughter, Ann, married Charles Fitzroy (later Lord Southampton) the 
younger brother of the Duke of Grafton. The next daughter, Susannah, married her couain, 
Col. William Skinner. The youngest daughter, Charlotte, married the Earl of Abingdon. 
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THE WARREN FORTUNE 1752 & 1772 
1752 1772 
Assets Nominal Value Income Nominal Value Income 
Land: £ o/o £ % £ % £ % 
New York 12,611 8.3 166 3.1 35,762 16.0 817 12.7 
New England 0.0 0.0 1,000 .05 0.0 
Ireland 18,663 12.1 1,061 19.9 37,145 18.3 1,380 21.5 
England 14,800 9.6 0.0 14,300 7.0 362 5.6 
-
30.0 23.0 31.4 39.8 
Loans: 
New York 5,255 3.4 313 5.9 4,375 2.1 284 4.4 
New England 6,470 4.2 305 5.7 0.0 o.o 
South Carolina 150 .01 15 .03 0.0 0.0 
England.Ireland 30,494 19.7 1,281 24.1 4,650 2.3 193 3.0 
27.3 35.7 <1.4 7.4 
Others: 
Stock Market 60,980 39.5 1,891 35.7 110,624 54.2 3,396 52.8 
Duke of Bedford 4,800 3.1 300 5.6 0.0 0.0 
Merchant Ships 1,000 .07 0.0 0.0 0.0 
42.7 41.3 54.2 52.8 
Total: 155,222 100.0 5,332 100.0 204,856 100.0 6,432 100.0 
At the time of his last illness Warren probably had no precise notion 
of the market value of all his assets, especially for his New York estates, 
hut doubtless he had ,a clear idea of his income. Yet the subsequent rise 
in income enjoyed hy his heirs during the next two decades, from £ 5,332 
to £ 6,432, was, owing to inflation, illusory. 52 In so far as inflation can he 
accurately gauged, then it can be said that income from the Warren 
fortune in real terms actually declined hy 1772, as the Table below shows. 
Date 
1752 
1772 
Base: 1701=100 
ADJUSTED INCOME 1752 & 1772 
Nominal Income Price Index 
£ 5,332 93 
£ 6,432 117 
Real Income 
£ 5,733 
£ 5,497 
Source: Elizabeth B. Schnmpeter, "English Prices and Public Finances, 
1660·1822," Review of Economic Statistics XX (1938), p. 35. 
112 Between 1752 and 1772 inflation was 21.8 per cent. See Elizabeth B. ScHUMPETER, 
"English Prices and Public Finances, 1660-1822", Review of Economic Statistics, XX (1938), 
p. 35. 
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The failure to maintain or advance the level of income between 
1752 and 1772 needs some explanation. The principal reason is to be 
found in the transfer to government securities after 1752 of capital in the 
form of personal loans. As loans, such capital had earned betw~n 4 and 
6 per cent in England, Ireland and New England, 7 and 10 per cent else-
where in America. Lady Warren's general reluctance to venture capital 
in loans, except on a reduced scale in New York, and instead to invest 
in the most conservative offerings of the London stock market meant a 
safer but relatively lower income. This is particularly true in view of the 
general decline after 1752 in the rate of interest on government securities. 
In 1752 Warren still held several stocks which returned more than 3 per 
cent, while by 1772 no such securities held by Lady Warren exceeded 
3 per cent. This loss of income was only partially offset by the rise in 
income from both the Sun Fire Office and East India stock after 1752, 
for the amount of capital involved, compared to that in government secu-
rities, was small. Even .this modest influence was further limited after 
1772 for the Warren heirs sold two of the fifty shares in the excellent 
Sun Fire Office. Finally, the decline in income can be explained in part 
by the loss upon Warren's death of the 6.3 per cent annuity from the 
Duke of Bedford, which incidentally also involved the loss of £ 4,800 
capital. 53• 
v 
What conclusions can be drawn from <this study ? First there is the 
remarkable rise in status. Warren broke away from the declining economic 
coudition of :his Catholic parents by conforming to the Established Church 
and by making a career in a relatively new profession under the patronage 
of well-placed connections. His naval career opened the path at first to 
modest affluence, and later with war to great wealth. His status as 
gentleman-officer and Irish landowner enabled him to make an advan-
tageous marriage in New York, which in turn opened new business 
opportunities to ·him. His rise focuses attention on the navy as a means 
to wealth of unprecedented dimensions. 
53 Warren was M.P. for the borough of Westminster. Cf. Edith CRUIKSHANKs, "Sir 
Peter Warren", in History of Parliament. The Commons 1715-54, 2 vols. (London, 1970), 
I, p. 522. For the arrangement with Bedford, see Bedford to Anson, 20 June 1747, Anson 
Papers, Addit. MSS. 15955, foL 141, British Museum. 
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That this meant "big business" caused Warren no concern. Like other 
naval officers on foreign stations he had traded on a small scale, and spoke 
with pride of his good relations with the merchants of Boston, New York, 
Charleston, Jamaica, Antigua and London. His position thus afforded 
him the opportunity of becoming as familiar with the state of trade as 
many leading merchants. His peculiar good fortune at Louisbourg, more-
over, allowed him to patronize the London house of Samuel & William 
Baker who held part of the contract to supply the garrison between 1746 
and 1749, and ultimately became one of the most important London 
houses trading with America. At a more general level, Warren's case 
illustrates mercantilism in action, for the wealth of Spain and France, 
seized on the high seas, was rerouted into English bond i88ues, which 
helped finance the war machine to thwart Spanish and French ambitions. 
Warren thus may be considered as a "war-entrepreneur" stimulating the 
process. 
What is also of general interest in Warren's case is the international 
character of ·his investments. He did not merely plough hack the wealth 
from his prizes into the English economy. Instead he made use of his 
experience both in America and heland; and his investments there ulti-
mately proved more lucrative than those made in England. The impres-
sion he makes when thus acting as an international financier is several 
light years distant from the traditional conception of the younger BO"n 
ekeing out a rather grim existence on the meagre wage of a naval officer. 
IDtimately, it should be noted, the entire Warren fortune was repatriated 
to England from heland and America, and .the international character 
given it by Warren was permanently lost. 
Warren evidently had great confidence in the economies of both the 
American colonies and of his native heland, a confidence which was 
shared by few men living in England outside the circle of London, Bristol 
and Glasgow merchants. His activities in America draw attention to 
aspects of both the land market and the money market, which historians 
have tended to ignore. In particular it is interesting to note the rather 
slight impact of the American Revolution upon the economic interests 
of the Warren heirs. The American victory did not result in the confis-
cation of Warren property, either in the form of debts or land, while the 
rights of the Warren heirs to tltese assets were guaranteed both by the 
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peace treaty of 1783 ·and the London treaty of 1794. Not only were the 
loans recoverable, hut rental income was received in the 1780s from 
American tenants, after several years of interruption and as if no political 
gulf now separated tenants and absentee landowners. Both tenants and 
debtors were obliged to meet payment by well.Jto..do New England and 
New York agents of creditors and landlords who, in the case of .the Warren 
fortune, were all members of the despised English aristocracy. This calls 
to mind the comment by Lord Halifax, th·at remarkable seventeenth.-
century political analyst, "When the People contend for their liberty they 
seldom get anything by their victory but new masters." M This evidence 
undoubtedly underlines the conservative nature, in economic terms, of the 
American War of Independence. It should also he noted that Warren's 
case shows that, while the yield on American land was less than on Irish 
or English, incompetent agents, frontier wars and the initial poverty of 
tenants all reduced this return considerably. The re81llt was that the real 
return was achieved only when the land was sold; and here the Revolution 
acted as a catalyst, for despite the excellent economic prospecta of the 
new republic the Warren heirs disposed of their potentially highly profit-
able American estate in the 1790s. 
The situation of the Warren assets in Ireland was somewhat different. 
Warren's land purchases showed him able to take advantage of the eco-
nomic plight of both Protestant and Catholic alike. Religion in this 
context was clearly a matter of indifference to him, so long as the price 
was right and the prospects of capital appreciation reasonable. These 
investments not only produced a return higher than similar inveetments 
in England, but also, in contrast to his American assets, were ·sold quite 
fortuitously at the height of the land market during the Napoleonic war-
time inflation at great profit to the Warren heirs. In Ireland he laid the 
foundation of the .family of John Johnson just as in America his interest 
established William Johnson in a position of great econo.mic strength. 
Here, too, religion was of less importance than family ties, for the Irish 
Johnsons were Catholics. Their rise in status clearly shows that, for well-
placed Catholic families in Ireland, the opportunities created by the relax-
ation in laws governing Catholic ownership of land in the fate eighteenth 
century ·had very tangible benefits. Their rise coincided with a general 
M Halifax: Complete Works, edited by J. P. KENYON (London, W69), p. 207. 
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upswing in :the Irish economy before :the over-rapid population growth 
of the first half of the nineteenth century imposed severe strains on 
Irish society. 511 
Finally, Warren's large interests in the London stock market raise 
oertain general questions about the soundness of this sort of investment. 
Like so many others of his generation Warren had great faith in govern· 
mental credit and an ample willingness (bred of expectations of capital 
gain) to feed the machine by which Britain was able to 6.ght her wars 
so ~uccessfully. By buying into the stock market at a discount during 
wartime uncertainties, warren realized a capital gain, equivalent to a 
further series of prize moneys, when in the 1750s the FundS reoovered 
and were selling at a level not again achieved in the eighteenth century. 
In addition Warren also put money into the East India Company and 
-the Sun Fire Office~ one the most successful British overseas trading com-
pany, and the other the most successful insurance company in the land. 
Yet after . his death, his widow and his heirs largely concentrated their 
·capital in government securities, even selling part of the excellent Sun 
Fire Office investment. As capital in the form of private loan8 was called 
in, it too was transferred to government stock. Yet with the mild price 
ioJlation of the second half of the eighteenth century and the depressed 
price of the Funds after 1755 this form of investment became much less 
attractive ·than it had been in Warren's heyday. lnfiation ate at the real 
value of revenue, the long-term fall in etoek prices ate at the capital 
value of their portfolio. Yet Lady Warren and the Warren heirs held 
on to · their investments. In theory (and perhaps this encouraged their 
policy) these asset.s were liquid; yet they were not sold. Instead, much 
less liquid capital in the form of land in America and Ireland, which, 
~espite political turmoil, had greatly appreciated in value and, in the 
-case of America, held great promise of further growth, was sold. This 
.set . of decisions illustrates the very impermanence of a fortune such as 
Warren's: mortality clearly played a crucial part in a non-corporate entre-
preneurial situation. Warren was obviously a keen businessman. His wife 
. and heirs, though careful in their 6.nancial dealings, were too cautious 
~ by half and quite without imagination and daring, the stuff needed for 
M See, in particular, L. M. CULLEN, "Problems in the interpretation and revision of 
· eighteenth-century Irish economic history", Royal Historical Society Transactions, 5th aeries, 
~ XVII (1967), pp. 1-22. 
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continued success in this field. Their knowledge of America and Ireland, 
always very limited, grew less, until, for instance, they had wholly for-
gotten that they even owned an estate in New England, or where exactly 
their Irish estates were. Their experience was confined to England, their 
ambition a 3 per cent return in the stock market and 2 per cent on land. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the Warren fortune had more or 
less fallen asleep. 
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